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Abstract
According to some simple models of the household, parental transfers should
equalize measured risk attitudes amongst family members. We explore the
theory behind this notion and then use a Holt-Laury mechanism to com-
pare attitudes to risk amongst 412 teenage children and their parents in 38
rural villages in central and eastern Uganda. Although within household
risk preferences appear to be weakly correlated, we ﬁnd large and systematic
diﬀerences between parental and child attitudes that are not eliminated by
controlling for loss-aversion and background variables such as age and edu-
cation. Children are substantially more risk loving than their parents and
conversely, slightly more loss averse than their parents. When we control
for individual, household, village and regional factors the results are largely
unchanged and in particular age is not an explanation of the diﬀerences in
attitudes. We ﬁnd that some aspects of risk and time preferences are linked
to poor performance at school, including repeating a year and dropping out.
Overall our results are compatible with a world in which parents protect chil-
dren from risk. Moreover, because measured risk (and discounting attitudes
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diﬀer between parents and their children, they suggest the value of measuring
the attitudes of both generations when considering the relationship between
preferences and schooling decisions.
Keywords: household, experiment, family, couples, children, risk attitudes,
Holt-Laury, prospect theory
1. Introduction.
According to some basic models of the household, parental transfers
should equalize measured risk attitudes amongst family members. In this
paper we report on the use of a Holt-Laury mechanism to compare attitudes
to risk and time discounting amongst 412 teenage children and their parents
in 38 rural villages in central and eastern Uganda. A main motivation is
the state of the literature on the intergenerational transmission of risk and
time preference attitudes. Much of the discussion in this literature focuses
on 'nature versus nurture' (e.g. Paola (2012)) but we argue that according to
many economic models, intra-household risk sharing may also produce pos-
itive correlation in risk-taking even when underlying risk attitudes are not
correlated.2 As such, we start from a simple household model in which par-
ental transfers bring children's risk taking into line with parental attitudes.
This baseline model, labelled the `risky rotten kids' model, in reference to
Becker (1974)'s original theory of the unitary household, provides a bench-
mark with which to compare risk taking by parents and their oﬀspring.
Another motivation is provided by the state of the school system in
Uganda. Despite the introduction of universal primary and secondary educa-
tion in Uganda the rate of continuation to the 5th year remains low at 56%.
One factor among many aﬀecting the low performance may be the preference
of the parents and the adolescents themselves towards education, since educa-
tion entails long-term investment with uncertain outcomes. Such investment
does not only include opportunity cost of schooling for adolescents but also
direct cost of education such as uniforms, meals and scholastic materials.
Past studies have acknowledged the role of risk attitude and discount rate
in household decision on schooling, but have typically focused on the prefer-
ences of one actor such as the parent (e.g Wölfel and Heineck (2012)) or the
2Similar arguments can be made for discount rates.
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elicited risk attitude of the individual as an adult (e.g. Belzil and Leonardi
(2007)). However it may be that for adolescents of secondary school age, not
only the parents' preferences but their own preferences aﬀect the schooling
decision. . In this context we conduct an experiment targeting adolescents
aged 12 to 18 to investigate the impact of adolescents' preferences on their
own schooling decision. 3
Recently there have been a signiﬁcant number of experiments conduc-
ted on intra-household decision-making. For instance, Bateman and Munro
(2005) test EUT for individuals and couples. Using student couples, He et al.
(2012) do something similar, while Iversen et al. (2011) conduct an experi-
ment on household eﬃciency amongst couples in a region that overlaps with
the area of this study. However, most of the family experiments involve
spouses as participants rather than children and indeed the set of economics
experiments which mix children and their parents is rather limited. In the
original economics experiment, Peters et al. (2004), mixes families in the pub-
lic goods games and ﬁnd children tend to free ride whereas parents 'teach the
kids a lesson' by behaving cooperatively. In Brazil, Reynolds (2008)conducts
a trust experiment played between 153 teenage mothers and their mothers
in Salvador, North-Eastern Brazil and ﬁnds in favour of a cooperative (joint
payoﬀ maximizing) model. Also in Brazil, Bursztyn and Coﬀman (2012)con-
sider the eﬀect of cash payments on school decisions while Cipriani et al.
(2013) examine contributions for parents and children for public good games
and cannot reject a null of no correlation within families.
There is also a substantial literature on risk attitudes amongst adults and
children that is relevant, but as with intra-household experiments, studies
that bring together results from adults and children from the same house-
hold are limited. Levin and Hart (2003) measure the risk aversion of young
children, Levin et al. (2007) shows that choices are reasonably stable across
time. Harbaugh et al. (2002) compare risk attitudes of children and adults in
the USA, Sutter et al. (2010) measure attitudes to risk and time preferences
amongst teenagers in Italy while Eckel et al. (2012) considers peer eﬀects
in the risk attitudes of school children. Weller et al. (2010) compares risk
attitudes from age 5 to 85 in a cross-section of US subjects. That paper, in
common with others, ﬁnds that generally risk aversion increases with age.
3In sub-Saharan Africa, Weir (2011) for Ethiopia and Appleton (2001), for Uganda
provide evidence on the factors that constrain participation in education.
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Within the group of papers that studies risk aversion in children, Levin and
Hart (2003) is notable because in one experiment they examine the correl-
ation between the choices made by children (6-8 year olds) and their carers
(typically a parent) and ﬁnd positive correlation. Meanwhile, in a large-scale
study Dohmen et al. (2012) and Paola (2012) compare intergenerational risk
attitudes in Germany and in both studies detect positive correlation between
the generations. Using a simply lottery choice, Zhong et al. (2009) ﬁnd high
levels of correlation of risk attitudes amongst a group of Chinese twins, and
attribute a large part (57%) of it to heredity rather than a shared envir-
onment. Cesarini et al. (2009) study, over 900 twins in Sweden were faced
individually with a sequence of six choices involving a 50:50 lottery and ﬁxed
sum of money. The authors ﬁnd high levels of correlation in behaviour - the
Spearman correlation is 0.222 for mono-zygotic (identical) twins and 0.025
for DZ (fraternal) twins, and estimate that approximately 20% of variation
in the attitude to risk revealed in the study is heritable.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd that although within household risk pref-
erences appear to be weakly correlated, there are large and systematic dif-
ferences between parental and child attitudes that are not eliminated by
controlling for loss-aversion and probability weighting. Children are sub-
stantially more risk loving than their parents and conversely, more loss averse
than their parents. When we control for individual, household, village and
regional factors the results are largely unchanged and in particular age is
not an explanation of the diﬀerences in attitudes. Overall our results are
compatible with a world in which parents protect children from risk. When
we turn to the relationship between risk and time preferences and schooling
we ﬁnd that the preferences of both adolescents and their parents can help
explain the variation in years of repetition and dropping out. Moreove these
factors are as strong as some other, more traditional explanatory variables
such as the education level and wealth of the parents.
2. Theory.
The standard `rotten kid' theorem model of intra-household allocation is
due to Becker (1974). In this n+ 1 agent model there is a parent, n children
(we set n = 1 in the exposition that follows) and one private good that is
available in continuous quantities. The child maximizes a utility function, v
while the parent maximizes u+λv, with l > 0 . Importantly, the parent has
the last word on transfers within the family. In this setting, the child will
4
choose the same action as would be chosen by the parent maximizing u+ lv
. It is very well-known that this theorem is not general (see also Bergstrom
(1989) or Dijkstra (2007)). It does not generalize easily to situations of
multiple goods, asymmetric information, boundary cases, changes in the se-
quencing of actions and so on. Still, it provides a benchmark model for under-
standing intra-household incentives and allocation that enabled subsequent
researchers to interpret empirical patterns of intra-household behaviour and
to suggest other more appropriate theories.
In the same spirit we develop a simple model of intra-household decision-
making in the presence of risk (for models which consider some similar issues
in the context of labour supply decisions, see Chami (1998) or Laferrère and
Wolﬀ (2006))4. The main point of our theory is to show that in households
where there are strategic interpersonal transfers, then there are some reasons
for expecting risk attitudes to be linked. As with the original model, we do
not suggest that is correct model of the household or even the best in many
situations. Rather it is useful order to generate a null hypothesis for the
experimental setting.
Consider a two person household where initial wealth for the parent and
child is M1 and M2 respectively. The parent makes a transfer, z, to the child
so that the parent has ﬁnal consumption M1 − z, while the child has ﬁnal
consumption, M2 +z. For simplicity, we take it thatM1 is always suﬃciently
large relative to M2 that in all circumstances the parent would wish to make
a positive transfer. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, u and
v are three times diﬀerentiable and increasing in their arguments.
In this context, consider an intervention that consists of a lottery that
pays ∆1 with probability p and ∆2 with probability (1−p). We shall suppose
that ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 < 0. We wish to know whether and when the child and
parent will accept the lottery, rather than the status quo and we say that
revealed preferences are aligned if for all lotteries, both parent and child
would make the same choice.
We consider two possible time lines for the decision. In the precommit-
ment version, the parent ﬁrst announces a transfer function z(∆) then the
agent (the child or the parent) chooses whether to accept the lottery. Note
that z(0) is the transfer in the situation where there is no lottery. The state
4General models of eﬃcient risk sharing within groups can be found in Wilson (1968)
or Townsend (1994)
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of the world i = 1, 2 is then revealed and the lottery paid out along with
the appropriate transfer. In the no-commitment version, the allocation of z
is decided optimally by the parent after the state of the world is revealed.
Consider ﬁrst the precommitment case.
Proposition 1. Under precommitment the parent accepts the lottery if and
only it is accepted by the child.
Proof. With precommitment the parent can choose any incentive scheme she
or he wishes, to make the child conform. For example if the parent prefers not
to accept the lottery, set z(0) = argmax{u(M1−z)+λv(M2+z)} and z(∆1) =
z(∆2) = z(0)−A, for some A > 0. Conversely, if the parent prefers to accept
the lottery, set z(∆1) = argmax{u(M1 + ∆1 − z) + λv(M2 + z)}, z(∆2) =
argmax{u(M1 + ∆2 − z) + λv(M2 + z)} and z(0) = min{z(∆1), z(∆2)}
In this situation of precommitment the rotten kid theorem prevails. The
child chooses the action that would be taken by the parent. In addition,
provided u+ lv is concave in z, the parent will choose z(∆) such that,
u′(M1 + ∆− z) = λv′(M2 + z) (1)
Write z∆ =
dz
d∆
and z∆∆ =
d2z
d∆2
. At an interior optimum for z, equation 1
applies and therefore,
z∆ =
u′′
u′′ + λv′′
(2)
Although the precommitment result is general, in the no-commitment case,
parent and child preferences are necessarily aligned only under speciﬁc cir-
cumstances.
Proposition 2. Under no-commitment, if both agents are risk averse and u
and v are either a) quadratic in their arguments or b) show constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA), then the parent accepts a lottery if and only it is
accepted by the child.
Proof. The parent accepts if,
pu (M1 +41 − z(∆1)) + λv (M2 + z(∆1))
+ (1− p)u (M1 +42 − z(∆2)) + λv (M2 + z(∆2))
≥ u (M1 − z (0)) + λv (M2 + z(0))
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Because of the diﬀerentiability of both u and v, we have,
u(∆) + λv(∆)
= u(0) +
ˆ ∆
0
u′ (s) (1− z∆) ds+ λv(0) +
ˆ ∆
0
λv′(s)z∆ds
= u(0) + λv(0) + λ
ˆ ∆
0
v′ (s) ds (3)
where the last part follows from 1. So, using equation (3) the parent accepts
a lottery when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s)ds ≥ 0 (4)
Meanwhile the child accepts the lottery, provided
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)z∆ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s)z∆ds ≥ 0 (5)
Comparing (4) and (5) we see that parent and child acceptance conditions
are equivalent if z∆ is constant. Obviously this is true if utility for both agents
is quadratic (so that u′′ and v′′ are constant). Meanwhile, using (1) again,
z∆ =
u′′/u′
u′′/u′ + λv′′/u′
=
u′′/u′
u′′/u′ + v′′/v′
(6)
If utility is CARA then u′′/u′ and v′′/v′ are constant and the result follows.
This is a risky choice version of the rotten kid theorem and provides a
benchmark result. It means that, for example, parent and child can make the
same choice in a Holt-Laury exercise, even if the two individuals have, when
separate, quite diﬀerent attitudes to risk. As we noted in the introduction
the correlation in risk attitudes between generations has not received much
attention. Most of the discussion about correlation has been in terms of
inheritance and environmental inﬂuences, (Dohmen et al. (2012)) but the
model outline here suggests that, at least for families that share a household,
intra-household transfers may create common risk attitudes even when risk
preferences per se are not inherited.
A question is what happens when individual preferences are neither quad-
ratic nor CARA.
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Proposition 3. Suppose there is no commitment, and both agents are strictly
risk averse. The parent accepts when the child accepts provided z∆∆ ≤ 0; the
child accepts when the parent accepts provided z∆∆≥ 0.
Proof. Consider,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s) (z∆(s)− z∆(0)) ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s) (z∆(s)− z∆(0)) ds (7)
This expression takes the sign of z∆∆. Thus if the child accepts the
lottery (i.e. (5) holds) and z∆∆ ≤ 0 then the parent also accepts. Meanwhile
if the parent accepts the lottery ((4) holds) and z∆∆ ≥ 0 then the child also
accepts.
The sign of z∆∆ depends on the preferences of the parent and the child.
Formally,
z∆∆ =
(λv′′)2 u′′′ − (u′′)2 λv′′′
(u′′ + λv′′)3
(8)
A person is said to be prudent when the third derivative of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is positive. In such a case for ex-
ample, an increase in risk leads to a rise in saving (Kimball (1990)). Here,
the sign of z∆∆ depends on the relative prudence of parent and child. When
the parent is prudent and the child is not, then z is concave in ∆. In such
circumstances the parent accepts the lottery when the child accepts, but not
necessarily vice versa. In other words, the parent reveals greater risk aversion
in choices compared to the child. Conversely, if the parent is not prudent
but the child is, then it is the child who reveals greater risk aversion.
2.1. Changing the Model.
It is clearly useful to understand how the result is sensitive to the as-
sumptions of the model. There are numerous ways in which the relationship
between parent and child could be diﬀerent from that supposed in the pre-
vious section, but we consider three kinds of adjustment: making an exit
constraint binding for the parent, relaxing the assumption that the parent
respects the child's risk tolerance and adding in loss aversion. These changes
are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
First, suppose the child can exit the household and the fall-back utility
(i.e. the utility at which exit is optimal) is v. When this is binding in
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all relevant states of the world, then the child is actually indiﬀerent between
accepting and not accepting the lottery. On the other hand, the parent bears
all the risk and so the parent's preferences will diﬀer from the child. More
speciﬁcally, if the parent accepts the lottery then so does the child, but the
converse need not be true. In this sense the parent reveals more risk aversion
than the child. Suppose now that the constraint is binding for ∆ less than
∆∗ , where ∆∗ ≥ ∆2. In this situation, the parent accepts the lottery when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
u′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
u′(s)ds ≥ 0 (9)
Meanwhile, the lottery is acceptable to the child when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)z∆ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆∗
v′(s)z∆ds ≥ 0 (10)
(In this equation, it is supposed for simplicity that ∆∗ < 0 but the arguments
which follow do not hinge on this feature.) We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose there is no commitment, the utility functions u and
v are both CARA and ∆∗ ≥ ∆2 . If the lottery is acceptable to the parent,
then the lottery is acceptable to the child. Conversely, if the lottery is not
acceptable to the child it is not acceptable to the parent.
Proof. Since utility functions show CARA and u′ = λv′ for ∆ ≥ ∆∗ then
equation ((10)) can be rewritten as,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
u′(s)z∆ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆∗
u′(s)ds ≥ 0 (11)
The diﬀerence between ((9)) with ((11)) is in the lower limit on the second
integral. It follows that when the left hand side of ((9)) is positive, then so
is the left hand side of ((11)).
So in general if the child's constraint is binding for some values of ∆ then
the parent bears all the incremental risk from lower values of ∆. As a result,
the child is better insured against risk and therefore more willing to take on
risky bets. As a result the revealed risk preferences of the child and parent
diverge even when preferences show CARA, with the parent displaying higher
risk aversion.
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In the second twist on the basic model, we suppose that the parent max-
imizes the function, u + λg(v) where g is a strictly increasing function of
v (and three times diﬀerentiable). If g is strictly concave we say that the
parent is overprotective and if g is strictly convex, we say the parent is
under-protective. The idea is that a parent may not respect the risk atti-
tudes expressed by the child. In this situation the ﬁrst order condition for
the optimal transfer by the parent is,
u′ = λg′v′ (12)
and therefore,
z∆ =
u′′
u′′ + λ
(
g′v′′ + g′′ (v′)2
) (13)
The parent's maximand can be written as
u(∆) + λv(∆)
= u(0) +
ˆ ∆
0
u′ (s) (1− z∆) ds+ λv(0) +
ˆ ∆
0
λg′v′(s)z∆ds
= u(0) + λv(0) + λ
ˆ ∆
0
g′v′ (s) ds (14)
So, using equation ((12)) the parent accepts a lottery when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
g′v′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
g′v′(s)ds ≥ 0 (15)
Meanwhile as before the child accepts the lottery, provided
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)z∆ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s)z∆ds ≥ 0 (16)
Proposition 5. Suppose there is no commitment, both agents are strictly
risk averse and both u and g(v) represent CARA utility functions. If g is
concave, then if the lottery is acceptable to the parent, then the lottery is
acceptable to the child. Conversely, if g is convex, if the lottery is acceptable
to the child it is acceptable to the parent.
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Proof. If u and g(v) show CARA then z∆is constant, using the same ar-
gument applied in equation (6). In this case, the child accepts the lottery
provided,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s)ds ≥ 0 (17)
Let g′(∆) be the derivative of g with respect to v evaluated at ∆, and
consider,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
(g′(∆)− g′(0)) v′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
(g′(∆)− g′(0)) v′(s)ds (18)
Equation (18) takes the sign of g′′. Hence, if g is concave (18) is negative
and therefore if (15) is positive then so is (16). Conversely if g is convex and
(16) is positive then so is (15).
The examples used above all take expected utility as a shared assumption.
In contrast, in models of reference dependent preferences, such as cumulative
prospect theory, it is often argued that losses are weighted more heavily than
gains. For some of the widely used versions of such models a weight η > 1
is attached to the utility from losses (e.g. Tanaka et al. (2010)). If the no
lottery income is taken as the reference point, so that the functions u and v
are used for gains (e.g. ∆1) while −ηu and −ηv are used for losses then the
valuation functions for the parent becomes.{
u(∆− z(∆)) + λv(z(∆)) ∆ ≥ 0
−ηu(−∆ + z(∆))− ηλv(−z(∆)) ∆ < 0 (19)
The value function for the child is deﬁned in an analogous manner. Note
that the sharing rule implies that changes in parental and child consumption
are positively correlated, so that a loss for the child is a loss for the parent and
so on. With this formulation, the propositions are unchanged, but with more
complex versions of reference dependent preferences the propositions must
be modiﬁed. For instance, in the original model of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), individuals are risk loving on the loss domain which would imply
one person would bear all the downside risk of the lottery in the optimal
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allocation.5 For such a case the relative attractiveness of a lottery for the
parent and child would depend on who suﬀers the downside loss.6
Proposition 6. Suppose that v and u (a) are concave in the positive domain
and convex in the negative domain (b) are twice diﬀerentiable except possibly
at 0, where the negative derivative is no smaller than the positive derivative.
Then (i) the child accepts the lottery if the downside loss is taken by the
parent; (ii) if the agent who suﬀers the downside loss accepts the lottery then
so does the other agent.
Proof. Consider the case where the parent takes the downside loss. The
parent accepts the lottery provided,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
λv′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
u′(s)ds ≥ 0 (20)
while the child accepts when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)z∆ds ≥ 0 (21)
The left hand side of equation (21) is non-negative so the child always
accepts the lottery.
In the case where the child takes the downside loss, the parent accepts
the lottery provided,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
λv′(s)ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
λv′(s)ds ≥ 0 (22)
Meanwhile the child accepts when,
p
ˆ ∆1
0
v′(s)z∆ds− (1− p)
ˆ 0
∆2
v′(s)ds ≥ 0 (23)
Since 0 ≤ z∆ ≤ 1, then when the child accepts so does the parent.
5The weighted sum, u+λv, is convex and therefore the ﬁrst order conditions represent
a minimum. For large losses, it may be optimal to overload the loss - i.e. create a gain for
one person and a larger loss for the other person.
6Some of the tasks used in our experiments involve choices between sure gains and
lotteries involving only positive sums in which case this ﬁnal argument would not apply,
provided the participants treat no gain as the reference point.
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The simple theory outlined above suggests that the revealed risk attitudes
of parents and their live-at-home children should be linked and in some par-
ticular circumstances they should be coincident. Of course there are other
reasons for a link, notably shared genes and a shared environment in which
parents can be expected to pass on some of their preferences and attitudes
to their oﬀspring. In the experimental evidence which follows we explore the
extent of this correlation.
3. Method.
The data for the study is drawn from an ongoing panel, the Research
on Poverty, Environment and Agricultural Technology (REPEAT) project
in Uganda, Yamano et al. (2004), Tanaka and Munro (2013). In wave 3,
conducted in 2009, a selection of adult participants took part in individual
experiments to measure risk attitudes and time preferences. The villages
(or Local Council 1, the lowest administrative unit in Uganda) were selected
from a stratiﬁed random sample across six agro-climatic zones: the high
potential bi-modal rainfall zone, the medium potential bi-modal rainfall zone,
the low potential bi-modal rainfall zone, the uni-modal rainfall zone, the
south-western highlands and the eastern highlands (Yamano et al. (2004)).
Because of the security concerns, the northern and north-eastern parts of
the country were excluded from the sampling. 1 shows the selected villages
where the 2009 experiment with 1289 participants took place.
In the adults sample, the average household size is 7.7 members. The
mean dependency ratio, the ratio of the number of adults to that of children,
is 1.2. Per capita income and the asset value of the respondents' household
are on average 152.7 US dollars (USD) and 207.2 USD respectively. Around
68 per cent of all the respondents were male with an average age of 45 years.
While 66 per cent of them are literate, the average years of schooling is
5.7. The average farm size was largest in the bi-modal rainfall zones than in
other zones, but this fact does not necessarily translate to the diﬀerences in
average per capita expenditure. The uni-modal zone has lower agricultural
potential with shortest growing period, but the average wealth is similar to
that in the high potential bi-modal rainfall zone with the same average land
size. In terms of crop production, while staple food crops such as maize and
matooke are grown by the majority of households in all the agro-climatic
zones, other crops such as coﬀee, sweet potato and rice have more regional
variation. The average distance to district town and the road condition for
13
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Figure 1: Study Area.
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the road to district town also vary by region. In the low potential bi-modal
rainfall zone, the distance to town is furthest, but the proportion of villages
with all season tarmac road for the road to district town is the highest; in
contrast, in the uni-modal rainfall zone, the average distance is shortest but
in 75 per cent of the villages, the road condition is all season dirt. In terms
of the population density, the high potential bi-modal rainfall zone is most
populous, followed by the uni-modal rainfall zone. The number of primary
and secondary schools seems to correlate with population density: the more
the people, the more schools there are.
In 2011, two regions (Eastern and Central) were selected for a follow up
experiment with adolescent children (deﬁned here as 12-18 years old) from
the panel households. Within the region, a 50% sample of 36 villages was
randomly picked, stratiﬁed according to mean income in 2005 (high/low),
primary school staﬀ student ratio (high low), distance to secondary school
(high low) and distance to town (near and far). Within each target village all
panel households with children in this age range were identiﬁed and invited
to take part.
3.1. Experimental Design
The experimental design follows the familiar format of the pair-wise choice
framework (Holt and Laury (2002)) simpliﬁed and converted into local cur-
rency. We played eight games in total using exactly the same parameters
and payoﬀs for parents and children. The options within the four risk games
games are presented in the Appendix. Incentives were given for the risk
games in order to elicit the subjects' preferences using the random lottery
method. Thus, participants were informed prior to making choices that one
of the risk games would be played for real and they would be paid cash ac-
cording to their answers in the game. In the risk games 1, 2 and 3, involving
gains (positive amounts), we asked the subjects to choose between column A,
which oﬀered a sure income of 4000 Ugandan Shillings (USh)7 and column
B, which oﬀered two diﬀerent amounts with probabilities ranging from 0.25
to 0.75. Considering the level of education and illiteracy of some of our sub-
jects, we simpliﬁed the notion of probabilities using four balls compared to
some of the versions of the Holt Laury framework that are used in laborat-
ories. In all tasks Column B is progressively preferable as one goes down the
7Between one and two days' wages for a typical adult subject in our study. For teen-
agers, 85% of whom were in school, the salience of the prizes was probably much larger.
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list. The fourth risk game, which involved gains and losses and was used to
measure the loss aversion, and the four time preference games were played
similarly, though the time preference games were played hypothetically due
to logistical constraints.
After all subjects had completed all eight answer sheets, a community
leader drew a ball from a bingo cage containing 32 balls (eight balls for each
of the rows in the four risk games). This ball determined the row number
of the risk game to be played. Participants who had chosen an option with
some risk then individually chose a ball from the four balls, 1, 2, 3 or 4,
which identiﬁed the prize amount and then ﬁnally the payment was made.
In terms of protocols there was very little diﬀerence between the experiments
with adults and with their children. The children were invited through the
adults, but the parents were not present during the playing of the games to
give advice and so on. The training methods used for the assistants and the
examples and script were the same in both cases. The adolescents did face
a survey questionnaire speciﬁc to their own educational experience, but this
was employed after the experiment was completed.
4. Results.
We begin with some background information on the sample of children
and adults who took part in the experiment, including those adults who are
not linked to adolescent participants. We provide some information about
the family characteristics, but more details on the parental sample and the
REPEAT panel can be found in Tanaka and Munro (2013). Except where
stated the demographic and background variables are from the 2009 wave.
The exceptions are the number of schools in the community, which was last
asked in the 2005 wave and the education level and age of child respondents
which was asked in 2011. Logged variables (Ln(x)) are actually ln(x+1)).
Community level variables for assets and land size are means for the whole
REPEAT sample in that community. The diﬀerence between the community
assets variables and means of household variables therefore represents some
selection bias in participation in the 2009 experiment.
The ﬁrst ﬁve variables in the table represent the agroclimatic regions.
The omitted category is Eastern Highlands. The maximum number of ob-
servations in the two sub-samples is given at the base at the table.
Our second background ﬁgure shows the age composition of the experi-
ment with children. The subjects were in the age range 12-17 with peaks in
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Table 1: Background Information on the Sample.
Adults
Variable Mean SD
Bimodal Low Rainfall 0.127 0.333
Bimodal Medium Rainfall 0.204 0.403
Bimodal High Rainfall 0.312 0.463
Uni-modal Medium Rainfall 0.101 0.301
South West Highlands 0.174 0.379
Distance to Town (miles) 13.947 10.991
All Tarmac Road 0.236 0.425
Distance x All Tarmac 3.622 7.888
Population Density 711.4 834.79
Number of Schools, 2005 1.035 1.529
Ln (Community Assets, US$) 13.06 1.273
Ln (Community Land, acres) 1.675 0.563
Household Size 7.576 3.688
Dependency Ratio 1.461 1.088
Ln (Land in acres) 1.594 0.743
Land owner 0.774 0.419
Ln (Value of assets, US$) 12.54 1.228
Age 44.98 14.74
Gender (female =1) 0.319 0.466
Years of education 5.722 3.656
Head of the household 0.753 0.432
Children in the household 4.123 2.511
SD = standard deviation N=1289
Children
Mean SD
0.185 0.389
0.288 0.453
0.366 0.482
0.093 0.29
0 0
15.82 11.03
0.215 0.411
4.815 10.71
519.521 569.43
.893 0.592
12.994 0.457
1.847 0.454
9.532 4.084
1.788 1.21
1.918 0.766
0.639 0.481
12.76 0.96
14.88 2.013
0.434 0.496
6.102 2.172
0 0
5.58 2.63
N=412
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Figure 2: Response Rates.
the distribution at 12 and 16. Non-response rates did not have a clear rela-
tionship with age, although there is some evidence in favour of the hypothesis
that response rates were lower with the older age groups. As a result the mean
age for respondents was 14.2 as opposed to 14.6 for non-respondents. For the
children, there were also some small but signiﬁcant gender and schooling
diﬀerences between the sample and the targeted group: 52% of the non-
respondent group were female compared to 44% in the respondents, whereas
mean schooling was 0.5 years greater amongst non-respondents compared to
respondents. Children who took part in the experiment were also more likely
to come from families with smaller land size, lower assets and be headed by
a female, although these diﬀerences were not signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Moving on from the descriptive data we now provide summary evidence
on the results of the game. Figure 3 shows the average switching point for
the children (red) and adults (blue) in the four tasks. In all tasks the children
have the higher switching point, meaning that on average children are more
likely to prefer the riskier choices.
Next for particular games we show the distributions of switching points.
Recall that lower switching points indicate greater risk tolerance. Figure 4
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Figure 3: Switching Points.
shows the frequency of switching points for task 3. The pattern was similar
for tasks 2 and 1. Here we see that the adolescents were more likely to
choose the risky option even when the expected gain from this was negative.
In other words many of the subjects were risk loving. Parents were generally
more cautious and were more likely to switch to the risky option when the
diﬀerence in expected value was large.
19
Figure 4: Distribution of Switching Points.
The distribution of responses to task three can be usefully compared to
those for four which has possible losses for the participants (see Figure 5).
In this case, both adults and children were much more likely to choose the
safer and loss-minimizing option in each row.
A number of studies, including Weller et al. (2010) have found that risk
aversion increases with age when lotteries involve only gains. The evidence
on other kinds of risky tasks is more limited, but Levin et al. (2007) for
instance in a study of younger children and their carers ﬁnd higher risk
aversion amongst adults for gains-only tasks but no diﬀerence in attitudes
when tasks involved some chance of losses. Our experiment involves older
children and their parents, but is consistent with this picture except that
the diﬀerence in behaviour by children and adults is not smoothly associated
20
Figure 5: Switching point for a task with losses.
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Figure 6: Age and switching.
with age. Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate this point, showing (particular in
the ﬁrst case) that the data is more consistent with a discontinuity: adults
are more risk averse. And indeed, amongst adults, it actually appears that
there is weak evidence of declining risk aversion with age.
For task 4, the results are not so clear cut and at least to the naked eye, it
is possible that switching point is not linked to age. To investigate the issue
further and to examine the correlates of risk aversion in the experiment we
construct a parametric model of choice, based on a stripped down version of
cumulative prospect theory model.8
8Adding a probability weighting coeﬃcient to the model makes little diﬀerence to the
results and does not change the basic message that risk aversion is higher for the adults.
22
Figure 7: Age and Switching: Task 4.
We suppose that preferences can be summarized by:
u =
M1−σ
1− σ 0 ≤M (24)
u =
η(−M)1−σ
1− σ M < 0
In this equation, η > 0 is a measure of loss aversion while σ is the coeﬃ-
cient of risk aversion. With the data in the experiment being in interval form
we need to process it to produce point estimates of risk and loss aversion.
We use the ﬁrst three tasks for each player to calculate an estimate for σ
and then task four to estimate η. We do this in two alternative ways. In
the calculation method, for each of tasks 1-3 we take the mid point of the
ﬁrst interval in which subjects switch from the safer choice to the riskier
choice. For example if the player picks A in task 2, row 3 and B in task 2
row 4, then her or his choices imply 4000
1−σ
1−σ ≥ 0.755000
1−σ
1−σ +0.25
20001−σ
1−σ and
40001−σ
1−σ ≤ 0.755500
1−σ
1−σ +0.25
20001−σ
1−σ . Solving the two equations simultaneously,
the implied interval for the risk aversion parameter is 0.92 < σ ≤ 1.62. In
the case of subjects who switch from A to B at one of the extremes one side
of the interval for σ is open-ended. For instance a subject who chooses A
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in task 1, row 1 and B in the second row of the same task, has an implied
value of σ that is less than -0.62. In this situation we use the boundary of
the interval as the estimate (e.g. -0.62). To get the overall estimate of risk
aversion we average the ﬁgure from the ﬁrst three tasks.9 For task 4, we
use the estimated ﬁgure for σ to estimate an interval for the loss aversion
parameter (see Tanaka et al. (2010) for a similar approach). We then take
the mean of this interval. As with the risk aversion parameter we use the
known boundary for the open intervals in the case of individuals who switch
choices in the extreme rows.
As an alternative we also use interval regression to produce estimates of
σ and η, regressing the interval on a variety of conditioning variables for the
agroclimatic region, household and individual. We label this the estimation
method. Again we do the procedure sequentially, using the data from tasks
1-3 to estimate the risk aversion equation which is then used to generate
intervals for the loss aversion equation. The estimated equations are used
to predict individual values of σ and η for each individual. This alternative
method has the advantage that it does not impose values for individuals who
switch at the extremes. 10
The results for the estimated equations are show in Table 2 where stand-
ard errors are clustered at the household level and are shown in parentheses.
The bottom line of the table reports chi-squared statistics for two likelihood
ratio tests of the null hypothesis of no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the coef-
ﬁcients of the adult and child games. These null hypotheses are rejected at
standard signiﬁcance levels (p =0.000). In fact with some obvious exceptions
such as distance to town, the relationship between control variables and risk
or loss aversion seems quite diﬀerent for children and their parents. One
clear feature of the data though is the absence of signiﬁcantly positive age
9In our experiment we did not force subjects to obey ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
As a result, we have some subjects who switch back between A and B within a task. For
these subjects we use the ﬁrst switching interval. Dropping them or using an average
switching point as a basis for an estimate or risk aversion does not change the conclusions
of the study.
10The disadvantage is that it is not appropriate when we want to link estimates of risk
aversion to environmental and household variables. Moreover, because most of the control
variables are constant within a household it tends to produce spurious within household
correlation of risk attitudes and loss aversion. A third alternative would be use interval
regression to estimate σand η separately for each individual without using the controls,
but the problem we face here is the limited data provided by four tasks.
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eﬀects.11 Actually, the coeﬃcient on age for adults is negative and signiﬁc-
ant at the 10% level, although the size of the eﬀect is quite small. Another
feature of the data is the absence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between male and
female respondents, whether adult or children.
Figure 8 shows separate plots for child and parent risk attitude based on
the calculated data. Given the discrete nature of the data and the limited
number of questions asked of the subjects we have some jumps at the ends of
the cumulative distribution, but what is clear is that there are higher fraction
of children with lower risk aversion coeﬃcients. In contrast, at high levels of
risk aversion, the cumulative frequencies are approximately the same. Using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the two distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(p=0.000).
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Figure 8: Distribution of calculated risk aversion.
11We experiment with age squared and cubed to see if there are non-linear eﬀects of
age, but these additional variables are not signiﬁcant.
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Table 2: Adults and Child: Aversion to Risk and Loss Estimates
Risk Loss Aversion
Variables Adults Children Adults Child
Bimodal, Low Rainfall -0.603** -1.712 -0.076 -3.595
(0.280) (1.173) (0.281) (3.225)
Bimodal, Medium Rainfall -0.915*** -1.722* 0.563** 0.062
(0.266) (0.992) (0.271) (3.280)
Bimodal, High Rainfall -0.298 0.257 -0.014 -6.359*
(0.228) (1.039) (0.243) (3.388)
Uni-modal, Medium Rainfall 0.199 1.284 1.278*** -4.033
(0.297) (0.909) (0.328) (3.490)
South West Highlands -1.007*** -0.414*
(0.238) (0.240)
Distance to Town -0.010 -0.105*** 0.015** 0.192**
(0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.083)
All Tarmac Road 0.384 -3.825*** -0.290 5.126
(0.284) (1.373) (0.254) (4.370)
Distance x All Tarmac Road -0.030** 0.218*** -0.014 -0.347**
(0.013) (0.053) (0.012) (0.147)
Population Density 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
# Schools in 2005 0.024 0.310 0.146*** 0.929
(0.036) (0.363) (0.044) (1.210)
Ln (community assets) -0.046 0.219 0.011 0.613
(0.100) (0.605) (0.099) (2.245)
Ln (community land) 0.517*** 0.641 -0.160 -5.861***
(0.130) (0.533) (0.139) (1.897)
Household size 0.001 0.097 0.010 0.213
(0.053) (0.110) (0.037) (0.451)
Household Dependency Ratio 0.027 0.118 -0.111 1.298
(0.108) (0.254) (0.098) (1.056)
Ln (land in 2009, hectares) 0.091 -0.131 -0.074 2.705**
(0.095) (0.303) (0.092) (1.117)
Household owns land -0.118 0.573 1.092*** 1.115
(0.138) (0.546) (0.130) (1.601)
Ln (value of assets in 2009) -0.055 0.098 -0.048 -1.735**
(0.058) (0.263) (0.055) (0.849)
Age -0.009* 0.123 -0.004 -0.332
(0.005) (0.086) (0.005) (0.350)
Gender (1=female) 0.203 -0.075 -0.173 -0.269
(0.162) (0.372) (0.156) (1.337)
Education (years) 0.010 0.021 -0.021 0.483
(0.017) (0.113) (0.018) (0.342)
Head of household 0.019 -0.028
(0.183) (0.181)
Children in 2009 -0.013 -0.107 0.066 -0.551
(0.089) (0.199) (0.068) (0.784)
Constant 2.557** -6.643 2.162* 27.275
(1.275) (7.711) (1.247) (23.424)
Ln(sigma) 0.823*** 1.343*** 0.560*** 2.452***
(0.024) (0.062) (0.025) (0.214)
Observations 3,299 1,106 1,087 387
log likelihood -6554 -1693 -2242 -1151
likelihood ratio test 423.9*** 1406.94***
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 9 shows the cumulative distribution of coeﬃcients of loss aversion.
Here the diﬀerence between the distributions is not so obvious, but parents
are typically less loss averse than children. A Kolmogorov-Smirmov test with
a null of no diﬀerence in distributions yields a p-value of 0.020.
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Figure 9: Distributions of calculated loss aversion parameters.
The fact that the children are risk loving whereas the parents are risk
averse provides a contradiction of the risky rotten kid theorem at the ag-
gregate level, but we also need to see the household level data. To produce
the plots shown in Figure 10 we pair each child with his or her parent and
calculate σc− σp where σc is the child's risk aversion parameter and σpis the
parent's parameter. Two plots are shown: one using the regression-based es-
timates of risk aversion and one using the calculation method. In both cases,
the children are generally less risk averse than the parent. For instance, for
the calculated data, 71% of children have lower risk aversion.
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Figure 10: Diﬀerence between parents and children, risk aversion.
For loss aversion generally children have higher loss aversion coeﬃcients
than their parents as is shown in Figure 11. For the calculated data, approx-
imately 60% of children have higher loss aversion coeﬃcients.
Although we reject equality of the parental and child attitude to risk, we
have not so far examined their correlation. For calculated risk aversion, the
correlation coeﬃcient between parent and child values is 0.0941 (p = 0.049 for
a test of the null that this is zero). So, in line with Cipriani et al. (2013)'s
results from the investigation of public good contributions, we come close
to accepting the null of no parental-child correlation in risk attitudes.If we
correct for the fact that in many cases more than one child from the same
family take part in the experiment, by clustering the data at the household
level, the p-value is 0.11. For loss aversion the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.2034
(p = 0.001) meaning that we clearly reject a hypothesis of no correlation
in loss aversion, in favour of positive correlation. Though the sample is
relatively small, we can also test for correlations between siblings, using the
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Figure 11: Diﬀerence between parents and children, loss aversion.
123 households where more than one child took part. In this case the within-
sibling correlation of calculated risk parameter is 0.356 (p = 0.029) while the
within-sibling correlation of loss aversion is 0.126 (= 0.174). So there is some
evidence of weak within-household correlation and the evidence is always in
favour of positive correlation between the relatives.
5. Schooling.
From a wider perspective we wish to know whether these features of
preferences are reﬂected in school behaviours.12 Out of the sample of parti-
cipants, approximately 13% had formally left school. Many of the children
12One thing we cannot do in this section is to establish causation, because as well as
reﬂecting preferences educational experience also changes attitudes. The variables that
might serve as instruments for our preference measures are either too weak or might have
a direct eﬀect on outcomes.
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though had extended periods of absence in the previous school year or re-
peated one or more years of schooling. The modal number of repeated years
was 1 (43% of students), with only 19.4% that had not repeated a year.
Approximately 80% of children had one or more days of absence in their
previous term of schooling, but the majority (68.3%) reported that in total
they were absent for one week or less. Out of those who had been absent and
were still attending school, 57% declared that the primary reason was their
own sickness. However, 11.6% were caring for others and 10.9% where absent
for unspeciﬁed family activities. Only 6.7% reported that an inability to pay
school fees was the main reason for absence. For repetition, overwhelmingly
the most common reason given was poor grades.
Though our data from adults and children on time preference is not the
product of incentivized questions because attitude to time may reasonably
play a role in schooling decisions we include it in the following models. In
order to this, for both adult and child we calculate estimates of the discount
rate and present bias. The assumption is that preferences over a stream of
consumption {mT , mT+1, ...} beginning at time T can be summarized by the
equation,
uT = mT + b
t=∞∑
t=1
ρtmt+T (25)
In this equation b is a measure of present bias and ρ is the discount factor.
A higher value for the factor means the individual is more patient. When
b = 1, the individual has no present bias and choices are time consistent.
When b < 1 the individual shows a bias towards present consumption. In
the experiment, we present subjects with four hypothetical tasks, two of
which have an option for immediate reward and two of which only involve
delayed rewards. An example of the task used is presented in the Appendix.
According to equation (25) present bias plays no role in choices where all
options involve delay. Thus we use these two questions to produce a calcu-
lated value for the discount rate (= −1+1/ρ) and then use this estimate and
the two tasks that have immediate reward options to calculate a measure of
present bias. 13
13Some of the results for the adult sample can be found in Tanaka and Munro (2013).
In general we ﬁnd that present bias is clustered around 1 for both children and parents,
but children have lower discount rates. In fact the mean discount rate for adults is around
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Because many of the factors that might inﬂuence school behaviour might
also aﬀect the decision to take-up the invitation to participate in the experi-
ment, we use a Heckman selection model. We use local rainfall on the day of
the experiment and temperature on the same day as the variables that are
unique to the selection equation; the identifying assumption is that transi-
ent changes in rainfall and temperature might aﬀect the decision to attend
the experiment but they have no long-term impact on absence, repetition
and drop-out. Note that region dummies are included in the model and this
captures major diﬀerences in annual weather patterns14. In Table 3 we re-
port regression results for equations that link parental and child attributes
to repetition, school absence and remaining in school. In the table the ﬁrst
reported equation is for the number of years repeated. 15 The second is the
associated selection equation. The dependent variables in the ﬁnal two equa-
tions are days of absence in the preceding term and a dummy for whether
the child is still in school (0) or has dropped out (1).
If we consider the selection equation ﬁrst, we see that age and being female
are negative factors. Students in more heavily populated areas are less likely
to respond to the invitation to attend as are the children of landowners. In
the model, we have dummy variables for the relationship between the child
and the head of the household. The omitted category here is child plus a
handful of children in other categories, such as non-relative or son/daughter
in law. Relative to the omitted category, being another relative or niece
or nephew lowers the probability of attendance. We also include 'invited'
which is the number of children from the household invited to take part in
the experiment. Generally, the more children invited the less likely it was
that any individual child turned up though the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. In
terms of eﬀect size, a one year increase in age reduces the probability of
attendance by 5.3%, whereas an increase in rainfall from 0 to 1 cm, lowers
50%, compared to 6% for children. These results are in line with the hypothesis that the
parents are protecting children from the ﬁnancial pressures faced by the household.
14The Eastern region overlap with the unimodal and East Highlands agroclimatic zones
while the bimodal low rainfall areas are solely in the Central area. Bi-modal high and
medium rainfall areas fall into both our sample regions
15The ﬁrst model is estimated in a two step procedure because of diﬃculties in con-
vergence for the maximum likelihood method. The ﬁnal two models are estimated using
maximum likelihood with errors clustered on households. For the ﬁnal two models the
selection equation is omitted from the table, but it is very similar in both cases to the
equation for the Years repeated model.
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attendance probability by approximately 14%.16 While the selection equation
is interesting in itself, but it is worth noting that a Wald test of the null
hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms in the selection and
main equations yields p-values of 0.96 and 0.30 for the school drop-out and
days absent models respectively. For the Years repeated equation, a test of
the hypothesis that the inverse Mills ratio is zero yields a p-value of 0.071,
so for this equation the null of no selection bias is rejected at the 10% level
of signiﬁcance.
In the equation for years of schooling repeated, children where the adult
female had more education were less likely to repeat.17 Where there were
more male adults in the household, number of years of repetition is lower.
Children in the Eastern region and in more densely populated areas were also
less likely to repeat, which may reﬂect school quality. Perhaps surprisingly,
travel time to school was negatively associated with repetition. This was
true even if we only looked at children who were still in school. Travel time
is not a factor in absence either, so it may be that conditional on getting to
school, children's performance is not damaged by commuting. There are only
weak links from the risk and discounting variables to school year repetition.
Children who are more risk averse and have lower discount rates are likely to
have more years of repetition whereas the head's risk aversion is negatively
linked to repetition, at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. 18
For the days of absence equation, very few conclusions can be drawn
with any certainty. Age is positively linked to days of absence as living in
the Eastern region. Days of absence tends to be larger if the person who
took part in the adult experiment was female. The causal link is not obvious
here - it is probably due to the fact that in many cases female participants
in the adult experiment were household heads as well and in many cases, de
facto single parents. In support of this interpretation we note that having
more male adults in the household is associated with lower absenteeism.
The ﬁnal equation concerns school attendance. Not surprisingly age of
the child is positively associated with leaving school. Meanwhile a higher
16Rainfall was not common during the experiment: approximately 20% of subjects were
in an area where rain was recorded on the relevant day; in the case of 17 out of 412 subjects
the rainfall exceeded 1cm.
17Our variable for adult female education is either the years of education for the spouse
of the head where the head is male or the years of education when the head is female.
18The results of a poisson model are very similar and are therefore not reported here.
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Table 3: Preferences and Schooling.
Variables Years repeated Selection equation Days absent School Dropout (probit)
Age of child in 2009 -0.075 -0.166*** 0.641** 0.406***
(0.095) (0.029) (0.322) (0.104)
Gender (Female =1) -0.067 -0.226** -0.627 -0.247
(0.200) (0.103) (0.795) (0.244)
Region dummy (Eastern = 1) -0.488* -0.120 2.195** -0.094
(0.258) (0.150) (0.937) (0.312)
Distance to Town -0.004 -0.008 0.120 0.021*
(0.010) (0.006) (0.088) (0.012)
All Tarmac Road -0.203 0.223 -0.887 0.221
(0.262) (0.165) (1.607) (0.319)
Population density -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Travel Time to School -0.007** -0.001 0.003 -0.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
Household Size 0.072*** 0.016 0.229* -0.045
(0.027) (0.019) (0.125) (0.037)
Number of Adult Men in Household -0.192** 0.041 -0.837** -0.070
(0.087) (0.055) (0.356) (0.102)
Loss Aversion -0.015 0.034 -0.026
(0.022) (0.121) (0.040)
Risk Aversion 0.083* 0.135 -0.156**
(0.049) (0.292) (0.077)
Present Bias -0.114 2.826* -0.646
(0.328) (1.628) (0.467)
Discount rate -0.012** -0.022 0.020**
(0.005) (0.028) (0.009)
Head's Loss Aversion -0.054 0.200 0.042
(0.033) (0.167) (0.048)
Head's Risk Aversion -0.095* -0.047 -0.110
(0.054) (0.277) (0.077)
Head's Present Bias -0.381 -1.542 -1.139**
(0.370) (1.844) (0.444)
Head's Discount Rate 0.002 0.015 0.005**
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
Head's Education, years 0.020 0.014 -0.050 0.006
(0.028) (0.017) (0.171) (0.034)
Head's Age, years 0.015 0.002 -0.027 -0.000
(0.009) (0.006) (0.038) (0.011)
Adult Female Education, years -0.071** 0.001 0.039 0.020
(0.029) (0.018) (0.107) (0.037)
Adult subject's gender (Female=1) 0.151 0.112 2.443** 0.218
(0.255) (0.163) (1.218) (0.291)
Ln (value of assets in 2009) -0.056 0.006 -0.151 -0.126
(0.096) (0.053) (0.678) (0.135)
Ln (land in 2009, hectares) 0.143 0.097 -0.109 0.080
(0.127) (0.071) (0.538) (0.148)
Land owner (dummy) 0.001 -0.002 -0.010* 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
Grand child of Head 0.000 -0.216 2.196 -6.506***
(0.359) (0.205) (1.725) (0.880)
Niece-nephew of Head -1.279** -0.763*** -0.666 0.509
(0.598) (0.198) (1.292) (0.643)
Other relative of Head -0.321 -1.039*** 0.373 -4.563***
(0.832) (0.289) (1.870) (0.649)
Rain on the Day of Experiment (cm) 0.423**
(0.204)
Temperature on the Day of the Experiment (C) 0.005
(0.153)
Number invited from household -0.062
(0.039)
Inverse Mills ratio 1.673*
(0.924)
Constant 2.941* 2.605*** -5.923 -4.325**
(1.518) (0.752) (6.990) (2.058)
Log likelihood . . -1717 -503.2
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 680 observations in each model33
distance to the school is associated with a lower drop out rate as is being
the grandchild of the head or other relative. Measures of wealth and the
variables for parental age and education are not linked to drop-out rates.19
Children with higher levels of risk aversion and lower discount rates are less
likely to drop out, which is intuitive. On the other hand, a higher present
bias for the adult is associated with a lower probability of school drop out,
while a higher adult discount rate is linked to dropping out. At the mean
values of these two variables (1.006 and 50.54 respectively20) the net eﬀect
on drop-out probability is negative.
Having summarized the impact of statistically signiﬁcant individual factors,
we consider their quantitative inﬂuence on the dependent variables. The pur-
pose of the exercise is to compare the relative eﬀect size of changes in the
preference variables with other, more standard variables. For instance, a
one standard deviation increase in the age of the child leads to a rise in the
probability of dropping out of 9.7%. In comparison, a one standard devi-
ation increase in the child's risk aversion yields an estimated 2.8% fall in the
probability of dropping out while a one standard deviation rise in the child's
discount rate increase the probability of dropping out by 3.1%. For the years
repeated equation, a one standard deviation increase in household size (which
is actually 4 people here) yields a predicted mean increase of 0.29 years re-
peated. The corresponding estimate for male adult members is a reduction
of 0.26 years. Applying the same procedure to the log of land cultivated in
2009 produces a ﬁgure of 0.12 years. If the child's risk aversion is raised by
one standard deviation above its mean value, the predicted number of years
repeated increases by 0.12 while a one standard deviation increase in the
discount rate lowers years repeated by 0.16. In short therefore, the impact
of the psychological factors in the models is not as large as some standard
demographic factors such as age and household size, but it is of the same
order of magnitude.
6. Conclusions.
Using an incentivized device, we measure risk attitudes amongst teen-
agers in Uganda and compare them to the attitudes of their parents. We
19In some cases children may be living with relatives in order to attend the school.
20It is often reported that hypothetical questions often result in relatively high revealed
discount rates (Coller and Williams (1999)) .
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ﬁnd that the children are much less risk averse than their parents. At the
same time they are slightly more loss averse. As a result, children are more
likely to accept risky bets, compared to their parents when all the outcomes
are gains. In contrast, when there is some chance of losses, the diﬀerence
between adults and their oﬀspring is small. The disparity in choices is in-
compatible with a simple, risky rotten kid model of household distribution in
which pre-committed parents control exposure to risk through ex-post trans-
fers. It is also incompatible with no-commitment and constant absolute risk
aversion or quadratic utility. It is compatible with some other stories, such
as overprotective parents,21 but here we are being speculative since as we
noted in the theory section there are actually a number of ways in which
changes to a simple intra-household model could leave to diﬀerences in re-
vealed attitudes to risk. However it is important to stress that the diﬀerence
between children and adults does not appear to be explicable in terms of
their diﬀerent ages (or education or any other obvious environmental vari-
able). Rather it is suggestive of a world in which being head of the household
is associated with individuals being more risk averse.22 Standing back from
the data, our results of weak within household correlation are in line with the
results reported for public good games in Germany by Cipriani et al. (2013)
but at variance with some twins studies for Sweden and China. The lack
of a close correlation between teenager's revealed preferences and those of
their parents suggest that it may be important to elicit both sets of parents
when trying to understand real-world choices in which both parties would
normally have some inﬂuence. This last point is particularly relevant when
we look at the relationship between risk and time preferences and measures
of schooling, where we can see that child preferences have as strong a link to
outcomes as parental preferences.
The policy implications of the results are not transparent, beyond the
obvious point that adults are not the only inﬂuential agents when it comes to
the educational decisions of teenage children. To the extent that children's
preferences are manipulable and that our results show causation, it would
21Since the children had similarly cautious attitudes to lotteries involving losses as their
parents, it suggests that the protectiveness of adults might involve some pooling of losses,
but allowing children to keep their gains.
22This of course is not necessarily causal: it may be that risk averse individuals are
more likely to be household heads. On the other hand in this locality, the default head is
usually the male spouse and most males eventually become married.
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appear that making children more patient (i.e. lowering discount rates) might
lead to lower rates of school drop-outs though it also might lead to more
repeated years of education. However there is not much evidence in our data
set that altering loss aversion or present bias would have a signiﬁcant impact
on education.
Appendix: The Four Risk Tasks and an Example of a Discounting
Task.
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